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1 Introduction
In many instances, organizations face difficulties in providing the proper incen-
tives to their members because performance cannot be verified, i.e., enforced
by a court. As noted by the literature on relational contracts, however, the
mutual dependence that repeated interaction between the same parties fosters
may allow contracting parties to overcome these difficulties. This engenders
an implicit, or “relational,” contract between them, whereby the principal
“voluntarily” rewards the agent for his effort. As the worst the agent can do
to the principal is to break off the relationship entirely, the most the principal
can credibly promise as a reward is the value of the entire future relationship
to her.
Our goal here is to analyze the workings of such relational contracts when,
at the time of deciding on rewards, the principal knows more about the future
development, and hence the value, of the relationship. Indeed, management
may e.g. be better informed about the likely evolution of demand for a firm’s
product than workers. In such a context, workers must trust management not
to use its informational advantage against them, e.g. by fraudulently claiming
a threat of future demand contraction to cut their bonus payments or even
let go of them.
We show that an optimal relational contract in such a setting can lead
to a dynamic that has been discussed in the strategic management literature,
which has noted that downsizing often seems less effective than originally
anticipated.1 The prevailing explanation for these implicit downsizing costs
seems to be that surviving employees tend to consider downsizing as a breach
of a “psychological contract” (Love and Kraatz (2009)), and thus switch to
a kind of punishment mode in response. As Cascio (1993) writes: “Study
after study shows that following a downsizing, surviving employees become
narrow-minded, self-absorbed, and risk averse. Morale sinks, productivity
drops, and survivors distrust management.” Love and Kraatz (2009) write:
“Though downsizing was perfectly legal and widely advocated as an efficient
business practice, it connoted opportunism and signaled that a firm was an
untrustworthy actor that might not be counted on to meet its commitments
in the future. Employees clearly interpreted downsizing as a betrayal and
characterized downsizers as untrustworthy.”
1See e.g. Cascio (1993) and Datta, Guthrie, Basuil, and Pandey (2010).
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Yet, there is some evidence to suggest that this “punishment mode” only
lasts for a limited period of time. Indeed, Goesaert, Heinz, and Vanormelin-
gen (2015) show that firm performance tends to drop at the downsizing event,
recovering at best to pre-downsizing levels afterwards. Meuse, Bergmann,
Vanderheiden, and Roraff (2004) and Meuse and Dai (2013) also demonstrate
that, while downsizing firms perform significantly worse than other firms by
several financial measures, this difference gradually vanishes, eventually be-
coming insignificant. Conducting a survey of employees of a large high-tech
firm, Amabile and Conti (1999) find that productivity significantly declined
during and immediately after the downsizing process, recovering again after a
while. The survey paper by Datta, Guthrie, Basuil, and Pandey (2010) quotes
several studies showing that the benefits of downsizing, if any, will materialize
only 2-3 years after the downsizing event.
Our paper provides an alternative explanation for the temporary lack of
effectiveness of downsizing. In this view, implicit downsizing costs do not
indicate a lack of trustworthiness, nor do they result from punishment for a
broken promise. Instead, they will arise as part of the path of play in an
optimal relational contract, acting as a commitment device only to downsize
when it is necessary to do so. As a consequence, these implicit downsizing
costs allow for increased productivity in good times.
More specifically, our model starts from the standard relational-contracting
framework, in which a principal and an agent interact repeatedly over time.
The agent has to exert effort to produce output, which translates into a profit
for the principal. Effort is costly to the agent. By assuming that the agent
is risk neutral and effort costs are linear in the level of effort exerted, we
can interpret our agent as representing the firm’s total workforce, which is
made up of homogeneous workers.2 Only one-period contracts are possible;
these cannot condition on the agent’s effort choice, which, although observ-
able, contains subjective aspects and is hence not contractible. As effort is
perfectly observable by both parties to the relationship, however, continuation
play can depend on the level of effort observed. In particular, the principal
can pay the agent a discretionary bonus for choosing the right level of effort;
this bonus can be enforced by the agent’s threat to leave the relationship if a
2This interpretation presupposes multilateral relational contracts, by which a deviation
in the relationship with one agent is punished by a complete loss of trust in all other
relationships, see Levin (2002).
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bonus payment that was due to him was reneged on. Therefore, the principal
can only credibly commit to a bonus that is at most as high as the expected
value of the continuation of the relationship to her. The principal’s profits,
which are generated by the (publicly observable) output in a given period,
depend on the binary state of the world (“type”) in that period, which is only
privately observed by the principal. The effort level the principal wants to
induce may thus well depend on the current state of the world. The type of
the next period is privately observed by the principal before she decides on
the current period’s bonus. She thus has some private information on the
value of the continuation of the relationship when she decides whether to pay
out the bonus, or to renege, and thus to end the relationship.
Our analysis shows that, even though there is only one-sided private in-
formation, some surplus may optimally be destroyed along the path of play,
leading to implicit downsizing costs. The goal of this arrangement is to deter
the principal from mulcting the agent of the bonus due to him by understating
the value of the continuation of the relationship. Indeed, lest the principal
be tempted by such a deviation, continuation play following a pessimistic an-
nouncement must be rendered sufficiently unattractive. One way of achieving
this goal would be to force the principal to pay the agent a transfer whenever
the continuation value is low. This, however, turns out not to be optimal in
our setting, the reason being that this penalty would hurt a truthful on-path
principal and a lying off-path principal alike. By contrast, a distortion in the
agent’s effort hits an off-path principal, who has falsely claimed that effort
is less productive, more than an on-path principal, who has been honest in
invoking a low productivity of effort. Such an effort distortion reduces output
and profits below levels that would be feasible at this point in time – which
however is optimal because it allows to sustain higher output and profits in
earlier, high-state, periods.
In a next step, we explore in Section 5 how the precise timing of informa-
tion revelation affects our outcomes. First, we assume that the state of the
world is revealed later than in our main model, at the beginning of each re-
spective period, i.e., after the previous period’s bonus payment is sunk. In this
case, private information is not costly, and the principal can credibly promise
the full expected continuation value as a means of providing incentives. This
implies that it is feasible and optimal to make the agent’s compensation in a
period independent of next period’s type. In a second step, we explore the
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effects of the type being revealed earlier than in our main setting, assuming
that next period’s state of the world is observed by the principal already at the
beginning of the current period, before the agent has chosen current-period ef-
fort. Now, the principal’s private information is again costly and truth-telling
conditions constrain profits, albeit due to an issue that has been absent be-
fore: Because a high state of the world in the next period potentially allows
for higher effort – and consequently higher profits – in the current period, the
principal has an incentive to misrepresent tomorrow’s type as high, and sub-
sequently to renege on the promised payment. It turns out that, on account
of this constraint, it is not possible to generate higher profits if tomorrow’s
type is high. Those will only be a function of today’s type, and will always be
constrained by the continuation value that would prevail if tomorrow’s type
was low, irrespectively of whether tomorrow’s type ends up being high or low.
In contrast to before, truth-telling can now also be achieved via fixed pay-
ments made to the agent at the beginning of a period. Put differently, either
effort will be independent of tomorrow’s state of the world, or a high state
tomorrow also triggers higher effort, albeit with a fixed payment made to the
agent before effort is delivered. This payment has to fully make up for the
increased value of production.
Thus, when the principal strives to motivate the agent to exert effort,
she is tempted to claim that the future looks bright and that hence the agent
will be compensated for his hard work. Yet when the principal is supposed
to compensate the agent, she is tempted to claim that the future looks grim
– and that the agent will consequently have to accept lower compensation.
In most of the paper, we focus on the case in which the principal’s type
is iid across periods. In this case, only a distortion in the next period hits an
off-path principal more severely than an on-path principal. Consequently, im-
plicit downsizing costs will only last for one period in this setting, after which
effort increases to its undistorted level even if the firm’s prospects remain
bad. Indeed, the management literature has noted that, at the occurrence of
downsizing events, there is often some overshooting in the reduction of labor
input, as evidenced by the fact that firms tend to increase labor input again
shortly after downsizing, while the firm’s environment has not changed.3
In Section 6, we extend our analysis to (fully or partially) persistent
3See Cascio (1993).
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shocks. In these cases, distortions gradually attenuate over time but only
ever vanish in the limit. The reason is that, with persistent shocks, an off-
path principal is hit more severely by a distortion in any future period, but
the difference in on-path vs. off-path costs diminishes with distance in time.
The idea that repeated interaction endogenously creates some scope for
commitment via implicit contracts has been applied to labor markets by Bull
(1987), as well as MacLeod and Malcomson (1989).4 These early papers ab-
stracted from informational asymmetries, focusing instead on the question of
how incentives can be governed by non-contractual agreements. Levin (2003)
augmented the analysis by introducing informational asymmetries, analyzing
the cases in which the employee privately knows his effort costs (adverse se-
lection), his effort level can only be imperfectly observed (moral hazard), as
well as the case in which the employer privately observes a performance mea-
sure, while not observing the agent’s effort choice directly. Malcomson (2016)
introduces persistent types into Levin’s (2003) adverse-selection model, and
finds that a full separation of types is not possible when continuation pay-
offs are on the Pareto frontier. Malcomson (2015) augments Levin’s (2003)
adverse-selection model by the introduction of different principal-types de-
noting the productivity of the agent’s effort in the current period. At the
time the principal decides on her bonus payment, however, she does not have
any additional information concerning future productivity, in contrast to our
setting. Halac (2012) analyzes the case of a principal who privately knows
the value of her outside option while not being able to observe the agent’s
effort level directly. In Halac (2012), there is no direct productive distortion
in the agent’s not knowing the principal’s private information; in our setting,
by contrast, the first-best level of effort depends on its productivity. In Li and
Matouschek (2013), the principal has one-sided private information as well.
In contrast to our setting, this information pertains to the cost of transferring
surplus to the agent, rather than producing surplus. Furthermore, the private
information pertains to the current period; information about the future is
symmetrically held. This allows Li and Matouschek (2013) to apply recursive
techniques. In contrast to the implicit downsizing costs in our setting, they
find that every optimal equilibrium has the property of being sequentially
optimal as well. The literature on implicit contracts also explores the opti-
4See Malcomson (2012) for an overview of the literature on relational contracts.
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mal behavior of firms in the case of asymmetric information on the marginal
profitability of employment (see Hart (1983), Azariadis (1983), or Grossman
and Hart (1983)). There as well, inefficiently low employment in bad states
of the world serves as a commitment device not to under-report the state
of the world. This, however, is the consequence of an optimal risk-sharing
arrangement between a risk-averse firm and its risk-averse workers.
The rest of the paper is set up as follows: Section 2 introduces the model;
Section 3 reviews some benchmarks, in particular the case of public informa-
tion; Section 4 presents the main results; Section 5 analyzes the impact of
different hypotheses concerning timing, while Section 6 discusses an extension
to persistent shocks. Section 7 concludes. Proofs not given in the text can be
found in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Players. There is one principal (“she”) and one agent (“he”), who are both
risk neutral and who interact repeatedly in periods t = 1, 2, · · · .
Actions. At the beginning of every period t, the principal makes an
employment offer to the agent, consisting of a contractible wage wt ∈ [−w̄, w̄],
where w̄ > 0 is assumed to be large enough. The agent then accepts (dt =
1) or rejects (dt = 0) the employment offer. If he accepts, the wage wt is
immediately paid. (If wt < 0, the agent pays −wt to the principal.) He
subsequently chooses his effort level nt ∈ R+. At the end of the period, the
principal can pay the agent a non-contractible, non-negative, bonus bt ∈ [0, b̄],
where b̄ > 0 is assumed to be large enough. Furthermore, she can send a
non-verifiable cheap-talk message θ̂t ∈ {θ
l, θh} at this time.5
Information. The public events (i.e. those that can be observed by both
the principal and the agent) in period t are given by ht =
(
wt, dt, yt, bt, θ̂t
)
,
where yt = g(nt). The production function g : R+ → R+ is C
2, satisfies
g′ > 0 > g′′ and limn↓0 g
′(n) = ∞, limn→∞ g
′(n) = 0. It is commonly known by
the players. A public history of length t−1, ht−1 (for t ≥ 2) collects the public
events up to, and including, time t−1, i.e. ht−1 := (hτ )
t−1
τ=1. We denote the set
of public histories of length t−1 by Ht−1. (We set H0 = {∅}.) In each period,
a strategy for the agent specifies what wage offers to accept as a function
5Given our equilibrium concept (PPE in pure strategies, see below for details), the
restriction to binary messages is without loss.
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of the previous public history, and what level of effort to exert if he accepts
employment as a function of the previous public history and current-period





, where, for each t ∈ N,
σAt = (dt, nt), and dt : H
t−1 × [−w̄, w̄] → {0, 1}, (ht−1, wt) 7→ dt(h
t−1, wt) and
nt : H
t−1 × [−w̄, w̄]× {0, 1} → R+, (h
t−1, wt, dt) 7→ nt(h
t−1, wt, dt).
The principal additionally knows her type in period t+1, θt+1 ∈ {θ
l, θh},
before deciding on the bonus payment bt in period t; the agent never learns
the realizations of the principal’s types. The values satisfy θh > θl > 0 and
are commonly known. We write θt = {θτ}
t
τ=1 for the sequence of realizations
of the principal’s types up to, and including, period t. The principal events in
period t are given by ht =
(
wt, dt, yt, θt+1, bt, θ̂t
)
; that is, the principal learns
about her period-t+1 type already in period t, before paying the bonus in the
respective period. A principal history of length t− 1, ht−1 (for t ≥ 2) collects
the principal events up to, and including, time t− 1, i.e. ht−1 := (hτ )
t−1
τ=1. We
denote the set of principal-histories of length t− 1 by Ht−1. We assume that
the principal’s type in period t = 1 is commonly known to be θ1 = θ
h and thus
set H0 = {θh}. In each period, a pure strategy for the principal specifies his
wage offers as a function of the previous principal history, as well as his bonus
payment and report as a function of the previous history, current-period wages






, where, for each t ∈ N, σPt = (wt, bt, θ̂t), and wt : H
t−1 →
[−w̄, w̄], ht−1 7→ wt(h
t−1), bt : H
t−1 × [−w̄, w̄] × {0, 1} × R+ × {θ
l, θh} →
[0, b̄], (ht−1, wt, dt, yt, θt+1) 7→ bt(h
t−1, wt, dt, yt, θt+1), with the restriction that
dt = 0 ⇒ bt(h
t−1, wt, dt, yt, θt+1) = 0, and θ̂t : H
t−1 × [−w̄, w̄]× {0, 1} × R+ ×
{θl, θh} → {θl, θh}, (ht−1, wt, dt, yt, θt+1) 7→ θ̂t(h
t−1, wt, dt, yt, θt+1). A pure
public strategy by the principal is a pure strategy which does not condition






is said to be a public strategy if, for each period t ∈ N,
it can be written σPt = (w̃t, b̃t,
˜̂






(ht−1, θt) 7→ w̃t(h
t−1, θt), b̃t : H
t−1 × [−w̄, w̄] × {0, 1} × R+ × {θ




t−1 × [−w̄, w̄]× {0, 1} × R+ × {θ
l, θh} → {θl, θh}.
While θ1 = θ
h, the principal’s types {θt}
∞
t=2 are i.i.d. across periods (ex-
cept in Section 6); for all t = 2, 3, · · · , the probability that θt = θ
h is q ∈ (0, 1).
The probability q, as well as the principal’s type in the first period, are com-
mon knowledge.
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Payoffs. If dt = 1, the principal’s period payoff in period t is given by
θtyt−wt− bt; the agent’s is given by wt−ntc+ bt, where c > 0 is his marginal
cost of effort. If dt = 0, principal and agent get their outside option payoffs
in period t, which are set to zero. Both players discount future payoffs with
the discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
Our solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium in (pure) public
strategies (PPE), as defined above. There are no long-term contracts or other
means for the principal or the agent to commit to a certain course of action.
In particular, the output yt is assumed to be non-verifiable.
Our objective is to find a PPE that maximizes the principal’s ex ante ex-
pected profit Π1 among all PPE. As expected surplus can be transferred freely
through w1, the fixed wage in the first period, any equilibrium maximizing Π1
also maximizes the players’ joint surplus given the constraints, as shown by
the following proposition, which parallels Levin’s (2003) Theorem 1.
Proposition 1 Suppose there exists a PPE leading to a joint surplus of s ≥ 0.
Then, there exists a PPE giving the principal an expected payoff of π and the
agent an expected payoff of u, for any (π, u) ∈ {(x, y) ∈ R+ : x+ y = s}.
Proof. The proof follows that of Theorem 1 in Levin (2003) and is
therefore omitted. 
As on-path equilibrium actions are completely determined by past type
realizations, we shall replace histories as defined above with the history of
previously reported types, which, on the equilibrium path, coincide with the
history of past type realizations. We shall focus on truth-telling equilibria;
i.e., on the equilibrium path, reported types will coincide with the history of
past type realizations, θt = {θτ}
t
τ=1. By our choice of equilibrium concept,
this is without loss in our main model of Sections 3 3-4. In a slight abuse of
notation, we will thus write w(θt) for wt(h
t−1), and n(θt) for nt(h
t−1, w(θt), 1),
the agent’s effort choice on the equilibrium path in period t given history θt.
In addition, we shall use superscripts h or l to indicate the type in period
t+1, given history θt, writing, for instance, bh (θt) for bt(h
t−1, w(θt), 1, yt, θ
h),
the principal’s on-path bonus payment after history θt, given that θt+1 = θ
h.
By the same token, we write Π(θt) = Πi(θt−1) for the principal’s expected
on-path profit, and U(θt) = U i(θt−1) for the agent’s expected on-path utility,
at the beginning of period t, given the history of type realizations θt and given
that θt = θ
i (i ∈ {h, l}).
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bl(θt) + δU l(θt)
)
.
for the agent’s expected on-path utility in period t.
The following figure summarizes the timing within each period:
P makes
offer










In this section, we analyze a few natural benchmarks against which to measure
our equilibrium.
First, suppose the principal and the agent acted cooperatively so as to
maximize their joint surplus. Our assumptions on the production function g
immediately imply that, in all periods t, the effort chosen would be equal to
nFB(θt), with n
FB(θt) being defined by the first-order condition
θtg
′(nFB(θt)) = c.
For the remainder of the paper, we define nFBh ≡ n
FB(θh) and nFBl ≡ n
FB(θl).
Now, suppose that the agent’s effort choice was not just observable but
also verifiable, while the principal’s type was her private information and both
the principal and the agent maximized their own respective payoffs. Since the
agent’s effort is verifiable, the principal and the agent can write a binding
contract specifying, in each period t and given any history θt, that wt = 0,
10
as well as bt = ntc if nt = n
FB(θt) and bt = 0 otherwise. This sequence of
contracts implements first-best effort levels, and, since the principal collects
the entire surplus, there is no sequence of contracts generating higher profits.
In particular, as truth-telling gives her first-best profits, the principal has no
incentive to lie.
If the game is played only once, the principal will never pay a positive
bonus, whatever the agent’s effort level may have been. Anticipating this, the
agent chooses n1 = 0, implying y1 = 0. In any equilibrium of the repeated
game, either party can always guarantee itself this static SPE payoff, which
constitutes its minmax-payoff. As we are interested in the best possible PPE
for the principal, it is without loss for us to focus on equilibria in which any
observable deviation triggers this harshest possible punishment.6
3.1 Public Types
In this section, we suppose that the principal’s type is public information,
while the agent’s effort is non-contractible. Thus, we assume that the agent
observes next period’s type at the same time as the principal does, imply-
ing that we here allow the agent to condition his strategy on the principal-
histories rather than only the coarser public histories. In this case, there is
no informational asymmetry; agency problems arise merely on account of the
non-contractibility of effort.
The agent always has the option of rejecting the principal’s offers forever,
guaranteeing him a utility of 0. Therefore, after any history in any equilibrium,
his expected utility will be at least 0, i.e., the following Individual Rationality
constraint must hold, for all histories θt:
U(θt) ≥ 0. (IR)
Furthermore, after pocketing the fixed wages w(θt), the agent must find
it optimal to exert the level of effort he is supposed to exert in equilibrium,
namely n(θt). Thus, his utility when exerting n(θt) must be at least as high
as his utility from exerting any other level of effort. As effort levels are ob-
servable, it is without loss for us to focus on equilibria in which any deviation
by the agent is punished in the harshest possible way, by giving him a contin-
6See Abreu (1988) on the optimality of such simple penal codes.
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uation utility of 0; in such an equilibrium, therefore, any possible deviation is
dominated by a deviation to an effort level of 0. Thus, the agent’s Incentive







bl(θt) + δU l(θt)
)
≥ 0. (IC)
It must also be optimal, after any history θt, for the principal to make the
bonus payments she is supposed to make in equilibrium. Indeed, as effort levels
and bonus payments are not contractible, these must be self-enforcing. Again,
we can focus without loss of generality on equilibria in which the principal is
punished with a continuation profit of 0 whenever she does not pay out the
bonus she is supposed to pay out; her best deviation in this case is to paying
a bonus of 0. This yields the following dynamic enforcement constraints
−bh(θt) + δΠh(θt) ≥ 0 (DEh)
−bl(θt) + δΠl(θt) ≥ 0. (DEl)
It is standard to verify that (DEh) and (DEl) can equivalently be combined
into a single constraint,
−
(




qΠh(θt) + (1− q)Πl(θt)
)
≥ 0. (DE)
The (DE) constraint states that the future benefits of honoring the relational
contract must be sufficiently large for the principal that she is willing to bear
today’s costs. Whereas these costs manifest themselves in (expected) bonus
payments, the benefits are provided by the discounted difference between on-
and off-path future profits. Since off-path profits, i.e., profits after a deviation,
are zero, the benefits are identical to expected future profits.
Finally, it must be optimal for the principal to offer the equilibrium con-
tract to the agent, i.e., Π(θt) ≥ 0. This, however, is already implied by the
(DE) constraint and our assumption that bonus payments are positive.
Thus, our problem is to maximize Πh(∅), subject to (IR), (IC), and (DE),
through our choice of effort levels n(θt), wage and bonus payments w(θt), bl(θt)
and bh(θt), for all histories θt. The following lemma details some characteris-
tics of an optimal solution.
Lemma 1 Assume that the firm’s type is publicly observable. Then, there
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exists a profit-maximizing equilibrium in which the agent never gets a rent,
that is,
• qbh(θt) + (1− q)bl(θt) = n(θt)c and
• w(θt) = 0 for every history θt.
Furthermore, equilibrium effort only depends on the current state, that is,
n(θt) = n(θt).
The lemma shows that there exists an optimal equilibrium in which the
agent does not get a rent and the (IC) constraint will bind after any history. It
also shows that the equilibrium is stationary. Hence, we can write n(θh) and
n(θl) for the respective equilibrium effort levels in any period t. The reason
for this is that, in the case of observable types, every deviation is observable;
there is therefore no reason to burn any surplus on the equilibrium path of
play.
Note that, as is also the case e.g. in Levin (2003) or MacLeod and Mal-
comson (1989), enforceable effort in any given period does not depend on the
current type but only on expected future profits. Indeed, current output is
already sunk when the principal decides on the bonus payment. Optimal ef-
fort, on the other hand, depends on today’s type. This tension delivers the
intuition for the following proposition, which summarizes a profit-maximizing
equilibrium with public types.
Proposition 2 Assume the firm’s type is publicly observable. Then, there
are levels of the discount factor, δ and δ, with 0 < δ < δ < 1, such that
• n(θh) = nFBh and n(θ
l) = nFBl for δ ≥ δ;
• n(θl) = nFBl < n(θ
h) < nFBh for δ < δ < δ;
• n(θh) = n(θl) ≤ nFBl for δ ≤ δ.
If δ is high enough, the first best is achievable. For intermediate levels
of the discount factor, nFBh is no longer enforceable, while n
FB
l still is. In
this case, the highest enforceable effort level is chosen in all periods t in
which θt = θ
h, while nFBl is enforced in all periods τ in which θτ = θ
l.
If the discount factor is so low that even nFBl can no longer be enforced,
the highest enforceable effort level is enacted in all periods. Note that the
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principal’s credibility today depends on next period’s type. Thus, she can
credibly commit to a higher bonus payment if tomorrow’s type is high. If
(DE) binds, it is indeed (strictly) optimal to have bh(θt) > bl(θt) because of
the agent’s risk neutrality.
4 Private Types
Now, let us assume that the principal’s type is her private information. Thus,
she has to be given incentives not to misrepresent her true type. A straight-
forward response would be to make the bonus payment independent of next
period’s type; however, while feasible, such an approach is generally not opti-
mal. In the following, we will explore how asymmetric information on future
profits affects the properties of a profit-maximizing relational contract.
In truth-telling equilibrium, the principal needs sufficient incentives to
reveal her type in every period. Specifically, after any history θt, it must be
optimal for her to pay out bh(θt) (rather than bl(θt)) if tomorrow’s state is
high, and bl(θt) (rather than bh(θt)) if tomorrow’s state is low; other bonus
payments never occur on the path of play and can therefore be deterred by
threatening the principal with a continuation profit of 0. Lest punishment be
triggered, once the principal has paid out bl(θt) at the end of period t, she can
only induce effort nl(θt) in period t+ 1.7
Because, for any strategy choice by the agent, the principal always has
a best response which is a public strategy, we only need to check the princi-
pal’s incentives to deviate to another public strategy. Furthermore, thanks to
discounting, the One-Deviation principle applies in our setting (see Hendon,
Jacobsen, and Sloth (1996)). Therefore, if tomorrow’s state is high but the
principal pays out the low-type bonus (or reports θ̂t+1 = θ
l, in case they are
7Note that a formal mechanism to transmit messages would not be required, whenever
the size of the bonus depends on tomorrow’s type, i.e. bh(θt) 6= bl(θt). In this case, bonus
payments serve as a message and also determine next period’s equilibrium effort. In our
equilibrium, whenever the principal’s report in period t + 1 does not correspond to the
bonus having been paid in period t, punishment is triggered. When bh(θt) = bl(θt) while
nh(θt) 6= nl(θt), a message is needed to tell the agent which level of effort to choose in
period t+ 1.
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where the second superscript describes the type in period t+ 2.
By the same token, if tomorrow’s state is low but the principal pays out











Therefore, the principal is willing to tell the truth in equilibrium following
history θt if and only if
−bh(θt) + δΠh(θt) ≥ −bl(θt) + δΠ̃l(θt) (TTh)
−bl(θt) + δΠl(θt) ≥ −bh(θt) + δΠ̃h(θt). (TTl)
As Π̃l(θt) = Πl(θt)+θhg(nl(θt))−θlg(nl(θt)) and Π̃h(θt) = Πh(θt)−θhg(nh(θt))+
θlg(nh(θt)), we can rewrite these constraints as follows:



















, where θ1 = θ1 =
θh, subject to (DEh), (DEl), (TTh), (TTl), (IR) and (IC) at each history θt.
As we show in Appendix B.1, this optimization problem can be substan-
tially simplified. First, the (DEh) constraint can be omitted because it is al-
ways more tempting for the principal to underreport tomorrow’s type than to
shut down. Furthermore, the agent never gets a rent, and the (IC) constraint
always holds as an equality. Moreover, bh(θt) ≥ bl(θt), which implies that the
principal will never want to claim that the agent’s productivity tomorrow is
higher than it actually is; i.e., the (TTl) constraint can be omitted. Thus, on
the principal’s side, we are left with only the (DEl) and (TTh) constraints.
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We further show in the Appendix that these constraints can equivalently be
combined into one, and that consequently nh(θt) will be independent of θt,
while nl(θt) will only depend on the number i ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} of consecutive
low shocks after the last high period. Therefore, we write nli to describe low-














































for all i ∈ N.
As mentioned above, the (EC) constraints are obtained by combining
(DEl) and (TTh) constraints for the respective effort levels. The left-hand side
of an (EC)-constraint is identical to the left-hand side of the (DE)-constraint
with public types. It weighs the cost of compensating the agent for his effort
costs against discounted expected future profits. With public types, this left-
hand side had to exceed 0 for the principal to be willing to incur the cost of
compensating the agent for his effort costs. With private types, by contrast,




≥ 0, which is an expression
for the principal’s information rent. Indeed, if (DE) constraints bind, the
principal would like to transfer her entire future profits to the agent. But
this is not feasible if the principal’s type tomorrow is θh (which happens with
probability q), because she always has the option of falsely claiming that the
type is θl. If she does so, she will get θhg(nl) in the next period, rather than
just θlg(nl), which determines the bonus the principal is supposed to pay. As
(EC) shows, it is on account of this information rent that a given level of effort
is harder to implement with private types.
(EC) constraints also imply that optimal efforts are the same in all high
periods. The reason is that there is no trade-off with respect to effort levels in
16
high periods. Choosing them closer to the first-best benchmark both increases
the objective and relaxes the constraint; indeed, making a high period more
attractive makes the principal less inclined falsely to claim to be in a low
period. The effort level in a low period, by contrast, depends on the history,
albeit only via the distance of the current period to the last previous high
period. The reason is that there is a trade-off with respect to the effort level
in a low period. Making a low period less attractive lowers the objective but
relaxes the constraint as it makes it less enticing for the principal falsely to
claim to be in a low period. Thus, the optimal effort level in a given low
period depends on the optimal effort level in the previous period.
In conclusion, the agency problem here consists not only in the non-
verifiability of the agent’s performance measures, but also in the necessity of
preventing the principal from claiming her type to be lower than it actually is
in order to save on her bonus payments. Lying generally does not come for free,
though, because only the respective low-type effort can be implemented in the
subsequent period. Thus, for the same reason as in the case of public types, it
can still be optimal to have bh(θt) > bl(θt), despite the principal’s temptation
to lie. Then, the principal’s tradeoff boils down to a comparison of today’s
benefits of a deviation (a lower bonus payment) with tomorrow’s costs (a
lower output). This aspects adds another dimension to the credibility problem
typical for relational contracts, in a sense that the principal’s credibility is
reduced by the information rent she can always secure herself because of her
private information. As we shall see below, tweaking tomorrow’s costs of lying,
by adjusting the output level given tomorrow’s type is low, can be a way of
boosting the principal’s credibility today.
Our first result shows that if the discount factor is close enough to 1, the
first best can be achieved.
Proposition 3 There exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ≥ δ, the unique
optimal equilibrium implies first-best effort levels nFBh /n
FB
l .
To get an intuition for the forces at play, recall that the (EC)-constraints
in fact capture two distinct effects. On the one hand, there is the classical
effect coming from the dynamic-enforcement constraints that the principal
would never be willing to make a bonus payment exceeding the discounted
expected value of the continuation of the relationship to her. As we have seen
above, this constraint can only ever bind in our setting if the principal observes
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the next period to be low. On the other hand, there is the need to incentivize
the principal to tell the truth because a higher enforceable bonus when the
next period is high may tempt the principal to lie in order to reduce her bonus
payments in the current period. A straightforward response to this temptation
is a reduction of bh(θt), accompanied by an appropriate increase of bl(θt) to
leave incentives for the agent unaffected. This, however, is restricted by δΠl,
which is the most the principal would be willing to pay given that tomorrow’s
type is low. Yet, as δ, and hence δΠl, increase, it becomes possible to increase
bl without violating (DEl); this in turn reduces the principal’s incentives to
lie. The proposition now shows that, when δ is close enough to 1, the (EC)
constraint will hold, and hence the principal will not have any incentives to
lie or to renege on her bonus payment.
Our next proposition presents the first main result of this paper. It
characterizes an optimal outcome, given that the discount factor is too low to
implement nFBh but high enough to implement n
FB
l .
Proposition 4 There exist discount factors δ and δ, with 0 < δ < δ < 1,
such that, in an optimal equilibrium, for δ ∈ (δ, δ), nh and nl0 are inefficiently
low: nl0 < n
FB
l < n





Note that, for the first-best solution, the (ECh) and (ECli) constraints
are identical but for the first term, which is nFBh and n
FB
l , respectively. Thus,
as δ decreases, (ECh) starts binding before the (ECli) constraints do. When
this happens, nFBh is no longer implementable and n
h is hence reduced below
first-best levels. Yet, as Proposition 4 shows, nl0 is reduced below n
FB
l as well,
even though (ECl0) does not bind. This “overshooting” relaxes (ECh) and
thus allows for a smaller reduction in nh than would otherwise be necessary.
Because the principal needs to be dissuaded from claiming that next
period’s type is low when it is in fact high, low periods need to be rendered
less attractive, and, in particular, those low periods that follow periods in
which the principal needs a lot of credibility, i.e., high periods. A natural,
surplus-neutral, way of achieving this goal would be to force the principal
to make a transfer to the agent if he claims next period’s type to be low.
However, such a transfer would relax (TTh), but tighten (DEl) to the same
extent. Therefore, (EC) constraints, which are combinations of the respective
(TTh) and (DEl) constraints, would not be relaxed.
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To develop an intuition for this result, it is helpful to split up (ECh)
again and to take a look at its individual components, the (TTh) and (DEl)
constraints for nh:







−bl(nh) + δΠl0 ≥ 0 (DEl)
Consider an arbitrary effort level nh < nhFB together with bonuses b
h(nh)
and bl(nh) such that (TTh) and (DEl) hold as equalities, i.e., (ECh) binds.
(Indeed, if only one of them was binding, for example (TTh), a first response
would be to reduce bh(nh) by ε > 0 and to increase bl(nh) by q
(1−q)
ε, which
would allow for a further increase in nh..) In order to relax (TTh), one could
pay a rent R to the agent following an announcement of a low state at the
end of the period, an arrangement equivalent to making such a payment at
the beginning of the next period. This reduces the right-hand side of (TTh)
by R, thereby relaxing (TTh) and allowing the principal to increase bh(nh) by
R as well. However, the principal also needs an incentive to pay R. Hence,
the (DEl) constraint becomes −bl(nh)− R + δΠl0 ≥ 0. As (DEl) was binding
before, bl(nh) must be reduced by R in order to keep (DEl) satisfied. But this
once again increases the right-hand side of (TTh) by R, making it necessary
to reduce bh(nh) by the same amount (and hence to its original level) – and,
at the end, nothing has been gained.
Thus, (ECh), the combination of (TTh) and (DEl) constraints, can only
be relaxed by downsizing costs if those hit a lying off-path principal harder
than a principal who truthfully claims next period’s type to be low. Mere
transfers cannot achieve this goal as we have just seen. However, the distor-
tion of effort levels as proposed by Proposition 4, which can be interpreted as
implicit downsizing costs, hits a lying off-path principal harder than a truthful
principal and therefore relaxes (ECh). To see that, assume that in the situ-
ation considered in the previous paragraph, effort after an announcement of
a low state is reduced by a small ε > 0 in the following period. This reduces
Πl0 – and consequently b




. However, the right-hand side




, which allows for an increase in bh(nh)
by the same amount. Asθlg′(nlFB)− c = 0, the resulting surplus destruction,
as well as the necessary reduction in bl(nh), are only of second order at nlFB.
The possible increase of bh(nh), though, is of first order, and (ECh) is even-
19
tually relaxed. Therefore, it is optimal to use a reduction of nl0 in order to
implement a larger nh. Thus, the game exhibits memory, and the equilibrium




would be implemented if the
game newly started with a low state.
This contrasts with the finding in Li and Matouschek (2013), where every
optimal equilibrium is sequentially optimal. In our iid model, this distortion
in effort levels only lasts a single period, and nli = n
FB
l for i ≥ 1. This is
due to two reasons. First, reducing nli for i ≥ 1 would not allow for a further
increase in nh because the resulting distortions in later periods would hit on-
path and off-path principals alike.8 Second, for discount factors above δ, (ECl)
constraints do not bind and first-best effort levels are feasible. Thus, implicit
downsizing costs indeed optimally arise on the equilibrium path.
Given δ is below δ, ECli constraints also bind for i ≥ 1. This consid-
erably complicates our maximization problem because all (ECli) constraints
potentially interact: A higher nli+1 tightens (ECli), whereas a higher n
l
i might
require a reduction of nli+1 and consequently relax (ECli+1). Therefore, we
have to consider infinitely many constraints. In the following, we derive a
number of properties of effort levels nli if δ < δ. Due to the complexity of the
problem, we restrict ourselves to the case qθh ≥ θl:
Proposition 5 Assume qθh ≥ θl. There exists a left-neighborhood of δ such
that optimal effort levels nli < n
l
FB, i ≥ 1, are characterized by one of the
following cases:
• nlj = n
l

























• qθh = θl ⇔ nli = n
l
i+1 for all i ≥ 1.
We prove this proposition by Lemmata 10 - 23 in the Appendix. It
shows that, unless qθh = θl, effort levels oscillate, with either a constant or
a decreasing amplitude, starting at their highest level nl1. If qθ
h = θl, by
contrast, effort levels nli (i ≥ 1) remain constant, as for intermediate discount
factors. We still observe overshooting in this region, as nl0 is constrained only









Here, we vary the timing of the revelation of next period’s type. First, we
show that a later revelation – the type of period t is revealed at the beginning
of period t – increases the principal’s profits compared to our main case. Then,
private information is not costly and the outcome equivalent to the case of
public information. Second, we assume that the principal observes the type
of period t + 1 already at the beginning of period t, before the agent exerts
period-t effort. In this case, private information is costly, but the nature of
the costs and the principal’s response substantially differs. Moreover, our
overshooting result in the previous section relies on there being no possibility
of monetary transfers in between the time of the agent’s effort choice and the
revelation of private information to the principal.
5.1 θt Revealed at Beginning of Period t
Assume that the type of period t is revealed at the beginning of period t
(this is equivalent to having θt+1 revealed in period t, but after bt has been
paid). First, we derive a profit-maximizing equilibrium for the case of public
information. Then, we show that the associated effort and compensation levels
also satisfy the truth-telling constraints under private information.
In contrast to before, the bonus bt is not a function of next period’s type
anymore and hence is certain (on the equilibrium path) at the time of effort
choice. In period t, the agent’s future compensation might still depend on θt+1,
though, through the fixed wage wt+1. But it turns out that it remains (weakly)
optimal to use only certain period-t bonus payments to reward period-t effort.
Here, we consider a quasi-stationary equilibrium in the sense that bonus and
effort are only a function of today’s type. The wage might be a function of
today’s and yesterday’s type, if it is used to provide incentives for yesterday’s
effort. We use left and right superscripts to describe wages (and profits) as
functions of θt−1 (left) and θt (right). For example, if the type in both periods
is high, profit is hΠh and wages are hwh. Profits can thus be written as
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hΠh = θhg(nh)− bh − hwh + δΠ
h
lΠh = θhg(nh)− bh − lwh + δΠ
h
hΠl = θlg(nl)− bl − hwl + δΠ
l





= q hΠh+(1−q) hΠl and Π
l




, subject to the following constraints:9
−nhc+ bh + δU
h
≥ 0 (ICh)









First, we show that it is weakly optimal only to use the bonus to provide
incentives, while setting wages equal to zero: If any fixed wages were strictly
positive, a reduction accompanied by a corresponding increase of the respec-
tive bonus would leave all constraints unaffected (for example, if hwh > 0,
reducing hwh by a small ε > 0 and increasing bh by δqε has no effect on ICh
and DEh) and not decrease profits. Furthermore, as in Lemma 1, we can show
























which are the same as in our main setting with public information. Therefore,
profit-maximizing effort levels are also characterized by Proposition 2, with
9Note that maximizing any other of the above profit streams would yield identical out-
comes because the equilibrium – as we will see below – is now sequentially efficient.
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levels of the discount factor, δ and δ ( 0 < δ < δ < 1), such that nh = nFBh and
nl = nFBl for δ ≥ δ; n
l = nFBl < n
h < nFBh for δ < δ < δ; and n
h = nl ≤ nFBl
for δ ≤ δ.
If the type is the principal’s private information, additional truth-telling
constraints, now imposed at the beginning of a period, must hold:
θhg(nh)− bh − hwh + δΠ
h
≥ θhg(nl)− bl − hwl + δΠ
l
(TThh)
θhg(nh)− bh − lwh + δΠ
h
≥ θhg(nl)− bl − lwl + δΠ
l
(TTlh)
θlg(nl)− bl − hwl + δΠ
l
≥ θlg(nh)− bh − hwh + δΠ
h
(TThl)
θlg(nl)− bl − lwl + δΠ
l
≥ θlg(nh)− bh − lwh + δΠ
h
(TTll)
To show that these constraints can be omitted, we plug the results from
the case with public information, hwh = hwl = lwh = lwl = 0 and bh = nhc








and the constraints become
θhg(nh)− nhc ≥ θhg(nl)− nlc (TThh)
θhg(nh)− nhc ≥ θhg(nl)− nlc (TTlh)
θlg(nl)− nlc ≥ θlg(nh)− nhc (TThl)
θlg(nl)− nlc ≥ θlg(nh)− nhc. (TTll)
These are naturally satisfied for the respective effort levels.
To understand the intuition behind this result, note that in our bench-
mark case, it would also be feasible to make the agent’s compensation indepen-
dent of the realization of next period’s type. But such a payment structure
would leave some slackness in the dynamic enforcement constraints, which
could be utilized in order to increase implementable effort. At some point,
however, truth-telling constraints start to bind, leading to the structure of
the profit-maximizing equilibrium that we have derived in Section 4. Here,
by contrast, the agent’s compensation can be independent of next period’s
type while fully exhausting dynamic enforcement constraints. Thus, imple-
mentable effort cannot be further increased. Therefore, it is optimal to make
the agent’s compensation (conditional on effort) independent of the realization
of next period’s type.
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5.2 θt+1 Revealed at Beginning of Period t
Now, we describe the properties of a profit-maximizing equilibrium for the case
that the type of period t+ 1 is already revealed at the beginning of period t,
before effort nt is chosen by the agent. First, we analyze how this information
structure affects a profit-maximizing equilibrium under public information.
5.2.1 Public Information
If θt+1 is (publicly) revealed at the beginning of period t, nt will be a function
not only of today’s, but generally also of tomorrow’s, type. This is because
enforceable effort in a given period is a function of expected future profits. A
high type tomorrow is associated with higher expected future profits and thus
a higher enforceable effort level today. By standard arguments, it is without
loss to analyze otherwise stationary equilibria. We therefore use superscripts
to indicate equilibrium values as functions of this and next period’s types.
For example, nhh is equilibrium effort in case today’s and tomorrow’s type are
high, nhl is equilibrium effort if today’s type is high and tomorrow’s type is
low, and so on.
Then, on-path profit streams can take one of the four values
Πhh = θhg(nhh)− whh − bhh + δΠ
h
Πhl = θhg(nhl)− whl − bhl + δΠ
l
Πlh = θlg(nlh)− wlh − blh + δΠ
h





≡ qΠhh + (1 − q)Πhl and Π
l
≡ qΠlh + (1 − q)Πll. The agent’s















whereas effort levels are bounded by incentive compatibility constraints,
−nhhc+ bhh + δU
h
≥ 0 (IChh)
−nhlc+ bhl + δU
l
≥ 0 (IChl)
−nlhc+ blh + δU
h
≥ 0 (IClh)
−nllc+ bll + δU
l
≥ 0. (ICll)
Now, although the bonus is a function of next period’s type, it is certain
at the time of the agent’s effort choice. This is different from the main part
of our paper, where next period’s type is revealed immediately before today’s
bonus is paid, and therefore uncertain at the time of the agent’s effort choice.
Furthermore, for reasons similar to above (Lemma 1), it is feasible and weakly
optimal to set whh = whl = wlh = wll = 0 and let (IC) constraints hold as
equalities. Therefore, bhh = nhhc, bhl = nhlc, blh = nlhc and bll = nllc.
Again, our objective is to maximize Π
h

















, i.e. that a high type is associated with
higher profits. Therefore, θt+1 = θ
h allows for a credible promise of a higher
bonus, and therefore for the implementation of a higher effort level, in period
t. The desired effort levels if today’s type are high (nhh and nhl) are also larger
than if today’s type is low, which creates a tension if θt = θ
h but θt+1 = θ
l. If
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the discount factor is sufficiently close to 1, none of the constraints bind and
first-best levels nhh = nhl = nFBh and n
ll = nlh = nFBl can be implemented.
For a lower discount factor, (DEhl) will eventually bind, and nhl < nhh = nFBh .
For even lower discount factors, (DEhh) and/or (DEll) will at some point bind
as well, and so on. These considerations are summarized in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 Assume θt+1 is publicly revealed at the beginning of period t. Then,
there are levels of the discount factor, δ, δ̃ and δ, with 0 < δ < δ̃ < δ < 1,
such that
• nhh = nhl = nFBh > n
ll = nlh = nFBl for δ ≥ δ;
• nhl < nhh = nFBh and n
ll = nlh = nFBl for δ̃ ≤ δ < δ.
• For δ ≤ δ < δ̃, there are levels of the discount factor δh and δl, such
that
– nhl < nhh < nFBh for δ < δ
h;
– nll < nlh = nFBl for δ < δ
l ;
• nhl < nhh < nFBh and n
ll < nlh < nFBl for δ < δ; in this case, n
ll =
nhl < nlh = nhh.
The early revelation of information is costly compared to a later reve-
lation – because no “cross-subsidization” of high future profits to low future
profits is feasible anymore. If information is revealed later (like in the previous
section), the resulting uncertainty allows us to use potential high future profits
to motivate effort also in case future profits are actually low. Here, a binding
(DEhl) constraint cannot be relaxed by a potential slackness of (DEhh), as
would be the case if information was revealed later.
5.2.2 Private Information
If next period’s type is only privately revealed to the principal at the beginning
of the present period, the relevant trade-off in truth-telling equilibrium is
different from the main part of this paper. There, the principal is tempted
to underreport her type because this results in a lower bonus payment to
the agent in the present period, at the cost of a distorted production in the
next period. The current effort level is unaffected by a lie of the principal,
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as the corresponding output has already been realized. If next period’s type
is revealed at the beginning of the present period, however, under-reporting
tomorrow’s type already results in a lower output today. Therefore, a lie is
associated with present and future production inefficiencies. The resulting
costs make the principal’s temptation to under-report her type vanish, and
overshooting as a consequence of downsizing is not needed to induce truth-
telling. Truth-telling constraints can still severely constrain profits, though,
due to an issue that was absent before: Because having a high type in the next
period potentially allows for higher effort, and consequently higher profits,
today, the principal might be tempted falsely to claim that tomorrow’s type
is high – and then to renege on the promised payment. It turns out that
this constraint in fact prevents the principal from achieving higher profits if
tomorrow’s type is high. Profits will only be a function of today’s type, and
will always be constrained by δΠ
l
– no matter if next period’s type is actually
high or low.
To formally derive this result, we keep the notation from our analysis
with public types. Though this restriction is not without loss of generality
here, we continue to focus on the same kind of quasi-stationary equilibria as
with public types, where fixed wages equal zero and (IC) constraints bind.
We will show below that, in contrast to before, the relevant truth-telling
constraints can now either be satisfied by a reduction of effort levels, or by an
ex-ante payment made to the agent. If these payments can be extracted by
the principal at the beginning of the game, such an agreement would indeed
maximize the principal’s profits.
Now, two types of truth-telling constraints arise. First, the principal
might misreport her type and then proceed with play as prescribed by equi-
librium (like in our main case). This yields the constraints
Πhh ≥ Π̃hl (TThh)
Πhl ≥ Π̃hh (TThl)
Πlh ≥ Π̃ll (TTlh)
Πll ≥ Π̃lh, (TTll)
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where
















qg(nhh) + (1− q)g(nhl)
]
are the principal’s profits in case today’s type is high and tomorrow’s type is
low, but where she falsely reports tomorrow’s type to be high.
The respective values Π̃hl, Π̃lh and Π̃ll are obtained in similar fashion.
The second kind of truth-telling constraints prevent the principal from misre-














Note that these kinds of constraints are not needed in our main case.
There, next period’s type is revealed after today’s effort and output have
been realized. They are thus sunk when the principal’s announces next pe-
riod’s type. Therefore, these constraints coincide with the respective dynamic
enforcement constraints.
Finally, (DE) constraints as specified in the previous section with public
information must hold. This yields
Proposition 6 Assume θt+1 is privately revealed at the beginning of period
t. Then, among the class of equilibria in which the agent does not get a rent
and faces binding (IC) constraints, Π
h
is maximized when nhh = nhl ≡ nh
and nlh = nll ≡ nl. Moreover, there exist discount factors δ and δ, with
0 < δ < δ < 1, such that
• nh = nFBh and n
l = nFBl for δ ≥ δ;
• nl = nFBl < n
h < nFBh for δ < δ < δ;
• nl = nh ≤ nFBl for δ ≤ δ
in this equilibrium.
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Importantly, effort is only a function of today’s type. High future profits
cannot be used to implement higher effort today. If this were the case, the
principal would have an incentive to misreport her type and then shut down.
Moreover, the temptation now lies in over-reporting one’s type because this
would be associated with higher productivity.
Note that for discount factors such that the first-best effort cannot be
implemented, it only matters that the principal’s profits not be larger if to-
morrow’s type is high. Instead of equalizing effort levels, we could also have
nhh > nhl, together with a payment to the agent before his effort choice, in




≥ −whh + θhg(nhh), (TThl2)
which is satisfied for θhg(nhh) − whh = θhg(nhl) (given dynamic enforcement
constraints hold). Thus, in order to make use of higher future profits and
induce the agent to work harder, the principal immediately has to pay him
for the extra effort. If the principal is able to extract the expected value
of these payments at the beginning of the game, this equilibrium generates
higher expected profits than that of Proposition 6.
6 Persistent Shocks
So far, we have assumed that the principal’s types are iid across periods. In
this section, we show that implicit downsizing costs may also obtain if shocks
are persistent – within our initial setup where θt+1 is revealed to the principal
before the period-t bonus is paid, but after effort has been exerted. First, we
explore permanent shocks. We assume that the principal starts out with a high
type, and that the type remains high for another period with time-invariant
probability q. With probability 1 − q, the type switches to low and remains
low forever. Then, we argue that the case with shocks that are persistent but
not permanent yields similar results.
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6.1 Permanent Shocks
As the problem conditional on the type still being high is stationary, it is
without loss for us to restrict attention to equilibria in which actions do not
depend on calendar time. Therefore, equilibrium high-type effort is constant,
whereas low-type effort depends on the distance in time to the (now perma-
nent) switch from high to low. Thus, equilibrium profits can be written
Πh = θhg(nh)− qbh − (1− q)bl0 − w









where wh and wli are defined analogously to n
h and nli.
The objective is to maximize Πh, subject to the following constraints.
First, the dynamic enforcement (DE) constraints must be satisfied for bh and
all bli:
−bh + δΠh ≥ 0 (DEh)
−bli + δΠ
l
i ≥ 0∀i ≥ 0. (DEli)
As long as the principal has not announced a switch to the low state, the
following truth-telling constraints must hold in a truth-telling equilibrium:






h + δΠ̃h. (TTl)
After claiming that the state has switched to θl, the principal has to claim a


















Note that our formulation of Π̃li takes into account that the principal does not
renege after falsely having announced a switch to state θl in the past. This
requires −bli+ δΠ̃
l





Suppose that the state switches to θl in period t. If it is a profitable
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deviation for the principal falsely to claim that the state has remained θh in
period t, then, by the One-Deviation principle (Hendon, Jacobsen, and Sloth
(1996)), it is a profitable deviation for him to revert to telling the truth by
claiming θt+1 = θ
l. Yet, if this single deviation is profitable, then it is also
profitable to continue lying in period t + 1. In this case, it will thus also be
profitable to continue lying with probability q while telling the truth with the
counter-probability. This gives




Finally, the (IC) and (IR) constraints are as before.
Lemma 3 and the first three properties of Lemma 5 go through essentially
unchanged. In Lemma 25 in the Appendix, we further show that (TTl) can be
omitted and (IC) will bind. This implies, inter alia, that bh ≥ bl0, n





i+1 and that (TTh) and (DEli) are the relevant constraints.
The proof of Lemma 6 goes through essentially unchanged as well. There-
fore, we can equivalently replace (TTh) and (DEl0) by the following (ECh)
constraint








We furthermore need to keep track of
−nlic+ δΠ
l
i+1 ≥ 0 (DEli)
for all i ≥ 0.
As before, the right-hand side of (ECh) expresses the information rent
the principal can secure herself by falsely claiming that the state is low. With
iid shocks, the principal gets θhg(nl0) after a lie whereas the agent believes
she gets θlg(nl0), the principal’s informational advantage extending but to the
next period. Here, by contrast, her informational advantage extends to the
first (random) period after her lie in which the state indeed switches to low.
As the principal maintains her informational advantage from one period to













In Lemma 26 in the Appendix, we show that, as before, constraints are
tightened for lower values of δ.
As δ → 1, the left-hand sides of the (ECh) and (DEli)-constraints for
first-best effort levels diverge to infinity, while the right-hand side of (ECh)
converges to q
1−q
(θh − θl)g(nFBl ) < ∞. Thus, if δ is sufficiently large, the
first-best effort levels nFBh and n
FB
l can be implemented. As δ leaves this
range, it is of interest whether (ECh) or (DEli) constraints start binding







denote the discount factor at which (DEli)-constraints
start binding for first-best effort levels, and δh the corresponding discount






l (g(nFBh )−g(nFBl ))
; i.e. in this case, δl < δh. For this case, the following
proposition shows that overshooting of the effort reduction may arise with
persistent shocks as well.





l (g(nFBh )−g(nFBl ))
and δ ∈ [δl, δh). Then, nh <











Whereas we still observe overshooting, the recovery is gradual and never
complete. Recall that in the case of iid shocks, having a distortion is optimal
one period after the announcement of a low state because the off-path costs
(i.e. if the state is in fact high) are larger than the on-path costs (i.e. if the
state is indeed low). Because states are iid, though, costs are the same on
path and off path in subsequent periods; there is thus no gain to imposing
further distortions, as the agent reverts to telling the truth after one lie by
the One-deviation principle.
With persistent shocks, however, falsely claiming that the type is low
forces the principal to stick to announcing the low state forever thereafter. As,
in expectation, the costs imposed by a distortion in effort in any future period
are higher off path than on path as there always is some chance that the type
is still high after T periods (for any T ), it is optimal to keep distorting in all
future periods, as, on account of the concave production function g, it is better
to smooth out distortions. The further in the past the first announcement of
the low state lies, though, the more likely it becomes that the state will indeed
have switched to low in the meantime; i.e., the difference in off-path vs. on-
path costs imposed by the distortion decreases. It is therefore optimal to
distort the less the further past the announcement of the switch to the low
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state one is. As the expected cost difference becomes negligible over time, the
distortion eventually vanishes. As with iid shocks, our optimal self-enforcing
contract is thus not sequentially optimal since nFBl would satisfy all (DEli)
constraints.
6.2 Partially Persistent Shocks
In this section, we analyze a setting where states evolve according to a Markov
chain with positive autocorrelation. If today’s type is high, the probability
of tomorrow’s type being high is qh. If today’s type is low, this probability
is ql < qh. We shall also write q(θt) for the probability of next period’s type
being high given the current-period type θt. We focus on a subset of the
parameter space for which our solution is qualitatively similar to our previous
results, with overshooting and gradual recovery.
Now, the truth-telling and dynamic enforcement constraints amount to
−bh(θt) + δΠh(θt) ≥ −bl(θt) + δΠ̃l(θt) (TTh)
−bl(θt) + δΠl(θt) ≥ −bh(θt) + δΠ̃h(θt) (TTl)
−bh(θt) + δΠh(θt) ≥ 0 (DEh)











































Note that our formulations of Π̃h(θt) and Π̃l(θt) again make use of the One-
deviation principle (see Hendon, Jacobsen, and Sloth (1996)).
With iid shocks, the principal was tempted to under-report her type
in order to save on her bonus payments today. This led to overshooting
in a single period in the optimal equilibrium. This overshooting induced
costs of lying that were larger than the principal’s costs on the equilibrium
path. Now, we face a similar tradeoff, with an additional component, however:
After a deviation (i.e., reporting a low type although it is actually high), the
probability of observing another high period, implying a larger bonus in the
next period, is higher than if the type had indeed been low. Therefore, the
costs of a deviation, in relation to those arising when the type is indeed low,
increase in next period’s high-type bonus. Therefore, with positive auto-
correlation, the high-type bonus in period t + 1 should be as high as feasible
to deter lying in period t, an effect that does not arise with iid shocks. Since
high-type bonuses are restricted by the respective (TTh) constraints, these will
bind in all subsequent periods. Now, binding (TTh) constraints are optimally
associated with distortions of low-type effort levels, for the same reasons as
above. Therefore, distortions continue in subsequent low periods, albeit at a
decreasing intensity.
To illustrate this claim more formally, we maximize Π(θ1) subject to
the (TTh), (DEl) and (IC) constraints (and omit the (DEh) and (TTl) con-
straints).
Combining (TTh) and (DEl) yields the following (EC) constraints, which


















+ δΠl(θt) ≥ 0. (ECl)
It is straightforward to verify that, if δ is large enough, first-best effort
levels satisfy these constraints. In contrast to the case of iid shocks, (ECl)
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might bind for higher discount factors than (ECh) constraints. This is because
autocorrelated shocks make not only first-best, but also implementable, effort
a function of today’s state of the world. We shall, however, focus on the case
that (ECh) binds before (ECl) does, as we did for permanent shocks.
While (ECl) constraints can thus be omitted, (TTh) constraints (which
constitute one part of (ECl) constraints) will bind for all subsequent histories.
Indeed, suppose to the contrary that there exists a subsequent history, θ̂t+τ ,
such that (TTh) at θ̂t+τ is slack, and (EC) binds. Increase bh(θ̂t+τ ) by some
ε > 0 and reduce w(θ̂t+τ ) by q(θ̂t+τ )ε. This relaxes the (EC) constraint at
history θt and leaves all other (EC) constraints unaffected.
From this observation, it follows that we can plug binding (TTh) con-
























By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 7, it follows that nh(θt) will
be the same for all θt. By the same token, low-type effort can be written as
nli, where the i indicates the number of consecutive low periods immediately
preceding period t along a given history θt.
Furthermore having (IC) constraints hold as equalities and using U(θt) =











































Proposition 8 The solution to the constrained maximization problem (1) has
the following features: There exists a δh < 1 such that




l for all i;
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• for discount factors in some left neighborhood of δh, nh < nFBh . Further-









Proposition 8 suggests that recovery may be gradual and never complete,
as in the case of permanent shocks. The solution to the maximization un-
derlying this proposition constitutes an equilibrium for parameter values such
that the (ECl) and (TTl) constraints hold at the solution. While we can show
that this is the case for an open, non-empty, subset of the parameter space,
we leave a complete characterization of this subset outside the scope of this
paper.
Concerning the intuition of this result, recall that with persistent shocks,
falsely claiming that the type is low forces the principal to stick to announcing
the low state forever thereafter. This is not the case with persistent, imper-
manent, shocks. Indeed, by the One-deviation-principle (Hendon, Jacobsen,
and Sloth (1996)), the costs of a deviation today are increasing in the size
of tomorrow’s high-type bonus bh – because the likelihood of having to pay
bh is larger off the equilibrium path. Therefore, tomorrow’s high-type bonus
blh is set as high as feasible, bounded as it is by the respective truth-telling
constraint. This truth-telling constraint is again relaxed by a large high-type
bonus the day after tomorrow, bllh, and so on. In contrast to the iid case,
these consecutively binding truth-telling constraints make it optimal to dis-
tort later nli as well. Because of discounting and the decreasing difference
between on-path and off-path likelihoods of having to pay high-type bonuses,
these distortions decrease with i, and eventually vanish, as for permanent
shocks.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that the phenomenon of implicit downsizing costs can be ex-
plained as an optimal commitment device for a principal not opportunistically
to misrepresent her private information. In order to prevent downsizing when
it is not necessary, an optimal relational contract imposes a cost on the prin-
cipal whenever she announces bad news. These costs manifest themselves in
a reduction of performance below feasible levels. Our model thus provides a
novel perspective on the phenomenon of implicit downsizing costs, which we
view as complementary to the psychological aspects being advanced by the
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strategic-management literature.
Dozens of studies have analyzed the consequences of downsizing. While
some have found downsizing to have the intended effect, such as e.g. a reduc-
tion of organizational slack, streamlined operations, or enhanced effectiveness,
others find negative effects on firm performance (see Guthrie and Datta (2008)
or Datta, Guthrie, Basuil, and Pandey (2010) for summaries of these stud-
ies). Guthrie and Datta (2008) explore the firm properties that affect the
consequences of downsizing. In line with the results of our model – where
downsizing costs do not occur if the agent’s performance is verifiable (see
Section 3) – they find that the negative effects may be more pronounced in
those cases where relational contracts seem to be more important. Indeed, in
their study, downsizing subsequently reduces firm profitability overall, but this
negative effect is almost entirely driven by industries with high research and
development (R&D) intensity, high growth, and low capital intensity. Fur-
thermore, Guthrie and Datta (2008) state that employee effort components
such as “creativity and initiative” (p. 112) are important in these industries,
and that those are “associated with organizational variability and enhanced
discretion, increasing the relative benefits derived from employee initiatives
and contributions” (p.112). Since these aspects cannot be easily measured
and hence specified in formal, court-enforceable, contracts, we would argue
that they indicate a larger importance of relational contracts in the respective
industries.
In our model, implicit downsizing costs increase the principal’s commit-
ment power, and consequently profits, in good states of the world. After a
while, however, these costs vanish, either completely (in the case of iid shocks)
or gradually (in the case of persistent shocks). A few studies have also ex-
plored this dynamic component when analyzing the consequences of down-
sizing. They find evidence that performance reductions following downsizing
are indeed only temporary. Thus, Meuse, Bergmann, Vanderheiden, and Ro-
raff (2004) compare firms that downsized with those that did not. They find
that firms engaging in big layoffs performed substantially worse immediately
after the layoffs, but this difference in performance eventually vanished. Us-
ing a similar approach, Meuse and Dai (2013) show for a different data set
that the downsizing firms performed significantly worse on a number of fi-
nancial indicators during the year downsizing occurred. The differences in
performance, however, grew smaller in subsequent years, becoming statisti-
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cally insignificant in the third year after the downsizing. Amabile and Conti
(1999) conduct a survey of employees in a Fortune 500 high-tech firm, find-
ing significant productivity declines during and immediately after downsizing.
Productivity recovered again after a while, however.
Finally, note that, in our model, we explore the employment of one agent
who exerts effort. We chose this approach for reasons of tractability, and in
order better to relate our approach to “standard” relational contracting mod-
els. Due to linear effort costs, though, one could also interpret our effort levels
as the aggregate labor input by a firm’s workforce. When one relates our the-
oretical results to empirical observations, the overshooting in our effort levels
might thus be construed either as the principal reducing her workforce by more
than would be sequentially efficient, or as the principal reducing the number
of workers to the efficient number (or even keeping more than the sequentially
efficient number of workers) while asking for less effort from the remaining
workers. The latter seems to correspond to the “punishment” discussed in
the management literature (an exception is Cascio (1993), who reports that
following downsizing, some “managers ended up replacing some of the very
people they had dismissed”, p. 98). Thus, while two very distinct real-world
phenomena, the reduction of the number of employees on the one hand and
the reduction of effort by employee on the other hand, map into a reduction
of n in our model, our analysis would suggest that given a firm engages in
downsizing, it should optimally be accompanied by some sort of temporary
turmoil. To further align our theoretical results with the empirical observa-
tions we have discussed, note that in reality, employment is also affected by
many aspects outside the scope of our model. For example, keeping a worker
on causes fixed per-period costs of employment, while firing and/or replacing
a worker is costly as well.10 Whereas fixed per-period costs of employment ac-
crue in every period, separation and replacement costs accrue only once for a
given employment relationship. This would suggest that temporary variations
of total labor input would rather be effected by changes in individual effort
levels, while the workforce is kept stable in order to economize on replacement
costs. Long-term changes in desired labor input, on the other hand, would
10For example, Dube, Freeman, and Reich (2010) report that costs to replace a worker in
California (including recruitment, selection and screening, as well as the costs of learning
on the job and separation costs) amount to between $ 2,000 and $ 7,000. Muehlemann and
Leiser (2018) show that in Switzerland, the average hiring costs amount to about 16 weeks
of wages.
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tend to involve a larger focus on adjusting the size of the firm’s workforce.
In this view, our theoretical results are in line with the observations from
the downsizing literature if shocks are (at least partially) persistent. Indeed,
in this case, it would likely be optimal to cut the firm’s workforce after the
type changes from high to low, while the temporary overshooting might be
accomplished by individual effort reductions.
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Appendix
A Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1
We shall first show that there exists an optimal equilibrium such that U(θt) =
0 for all histories θt. If U(θ1) > 0, reduce w(θ1) by U(θ1). For t > 1, assume
to the contrary that, in an optimal equilibrium, U i(θt) > 0 for some history θt
and i ∈ {h, l}. Now, reduce wi(θt) by U i(θt) and increase the respective bonus
in the previous period, bi(θt), by δU i(θt). Since −bi(θt) + δΠi(θt) and bi(θt) +
δU i(θt) remain unchanged, this change leaves the agent’s (IC) constraints
as well as all of the principal’s constraints at history θt and all predecessor
histories unaffected. Furthermore, the principal’s profits at history θt as well
as in all predecessor histories remain unchanged. We can thus without loss
focus on equilibria such that U(θt) = 0 for all histories θt.
Now, suppose that there exists a history θτ after which the (IC) constraint
does not bind. Note that a non-binding (IC) constraint implies that either
bh(θτ ) > 0 or bl(θτ ) > 0. Thus, there exists an ε > 0 such that, if either
bh(θτ ) is reduced by ε
q
or bl(θτ ) by ε
1−q
, the (IC) constraint is still satisfied.
If w(θτ ) is at the same time increased by ε, the (DE) constraint for history
θτ is relaxed, and all constraints for all other histories θt are unaffected by
this change. This adjustment potentially increases profits if (DE) for history
θτ binds, and leaves profits unaffected if (DE) for history θτ is slack, hence is
optimal. Thus, we have shown that there exists an optimal equilibrium with
the property that w(θt) = 0, U(θt) = 0, and qbh(θt) + (1 − q)bl(θt) = n(θt)c
for all histories θt.
To prove the final part of the Lemma, we first rewrite the (DE) constraint:
−n(θt)c+ δ
(
qΠh(θt) + (1− q)Πl(θt)
)
≥ 0. (DE)
In addition, note that effort levels will never exceed the first best (oth-
erwise, a reduction would increase profits without violating any of the con-
straints). Now, assume that there are histories θτ̃ and θτ , with nh(θτ̃ ) >















by increasing the current period’s effort level to
nh(θτ̃ ), while leaving the continuation play unchanged. Now, suppose that
























relaxing the (DE) constraint in τ . It thus becomes possible to increase nh(θτ )
to nh(θτ̃ ). This increases both the principal’s current and future profits. A
similar argument applies to the low state. Hence, equilibrium effort only de-
pends on the current state. 
Proof of Proposition 2
To ease the notational burden, we write nh ≡ n(θh) and nl ≡ n(θl). The


































where λDEi denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the (DE)-constraint,
given the current type is θi ∈ {θl, θh}.
By strict concavity of g, the first-order conditions are both necessary and
sufficient for an optimum. By the Inada Conditions on g, optimal effort levels
are interior, and hence characterized by ∂L
∂ni

























(1− q)(1 + λDEh + λDEl)− λDElc.
As nh ≥ nl at an optimum, we know that λDEh = 0 implies λDEl = 0.
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As our system of equations characterizing the solution
(









nh, nl, λDEh , λDEl
)
can be written as continuous functions of δ. Thus, profits Πh and Πl are con-
tinuous in δ.
The left-hand sides of the (DEi) constraints are increasing in δ,
11 hence
maximum enforceable effort increases in δ as well.
For δ → 1, (DEi) are satisfied for first-best effort levels, since θg(n
FB(θ))−
nFB(θ)c > 0 for both θ ∈ {θh, θl}. Thus, there exists a δ̄ ∈ [0, 1) such that
λDEh = λDEl = 0 for all δ > δ̄. For δ = 0, no positive effort can be enforced.
Thus, δ̄ > 0. Moreover, by continuity of the (DEi)-constraints in δ, for every
pair of effort levels (nh, nl) between zero and the respective first-best effort
levels nFBl and n
FB
h , there exists a discount factor δ(n
h, nl) such that the con-
straint (DEh) holds for δ ≥ δ(n
h, nl) and is violated for δ < δ(nh, nl). Set
δ̄ = δ(nFBh , n
FB




h , (DEl) holds with slackness at n
l = nFBl
for δ = δ̄. Let nh(δ) be defined by θhg′(nh(δ)) = c1−δ(1−q)
δq
; as g′ is continu-
ous, strictly decreasing and takes on all values in (0,∞), nh(δ) exists and is
unique; furthermore, the Inverse Function Theorem implies that it is a con-
tinuous function of δ. As the partial derivative of (DEh) with respect to n
h
is always strictly negative at nh = nFBh , we have that n
h(δ) < nFBh . Clearly,
the solution n̂h to the optimization problem in which only (DEh) is imposed
entails n̂h ∈ [nh(δ), nFBh ]. Direct computation shows the partial derivative of
(DEh) with respect to n
h to be strictly negative on (nh(δ), nFBh ), while its
partial derivative with respect to δ is strictly positive and, since δ ≤ δ̄ < 1,
bounded. Therefore n̂h is a continuous function of δ, and thus, by continuity
of (DEl) in (n
h, δ), there exists a δ ∈ (0, δ̄) such that (DEl) continues to hold
with slackness for all δ ∈ (δ, δ̄]. This implies nl = nFBl < n
h < nFBh . For
δ ≤ δ, both (DE) constraints bind, and hence nh = nl. 
B Proofs for Section 4
B.1 Preliminaries for the iid Model
The object of this subsection is to simplify the problem by eliminating some
of the constraints while deriving some structural properties of an optimal
11This can be shown formally by an argument analogous to the one underlying the proof
of Lemma 9.
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equilibrium. We begin with the simple observation that (DEh) can be omitted.
Lemma 3 For any history θt, the (DEh) constraint can be omitted.





Since the right hand side is positive, this implies (DEh). 
The following lemma will be useful to derive some characteristics of an
optimal equilibrium.
Lemma 4 For any history θt with nh(θt) 6= nl(θt), (TTh) and (TTl) are not
both binding.
Proof. Assume there is a history θτ where both constraints bind simulta-
neously even though nh(θτ ) 6= nl(θτ ). Then, (TTh) implies bh(θτ ) = bl(θτ ) +









. Since θh − θl > 0 and g is strictly
increasing, this contradicts the claim that both constraints bind for nh(θτ ) 6=
nl(θτ ). 
Now, we can substantially simplify the problem by establishing some
structural properties of an optimal equilibrium.
Lemma 5 There exists an optimal equilibrium with the properties that, for
every history θt,
• U(θt) = 0,
• Πh(θt) ≥ Π̃l(θt),
• bh(θt) ≥ bl(θt),
• the (TTl) constraint can be omitted,
• n(θt)c = qbh(θt) + (1− q)bl(θt) and w(θt) = 0.
Proof. We start with proving the first two parts. Suppose to the contrary
that there exists a history θt of length t ≥ 1 and an equilibrium such that,
following history θt, the principal is strictly better off in this equilibrium than
in any equilibrium satisfying points 1.-2. We show by construction that this
cannot be the case.
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1. Assume that, in an optimal equilibrium, U i(θt) > 0, i ∈ {h, l} for some
history θt of length t. Reduce wi(θt) by U i(θt) and increase the respective
bonus in the previous period, bi(θt), by δU i(θt). Since −bi(θt) + δΠi(θt)
and bi(θt) + δU i(θt) remain unchanged, this change leaves the agent’s
(IC) and (IR) constraints as well as all of the principal’s constraints
at history θt and all predecessor histories unaffected. Furthermore, the
principal’s profits at history θt as well as in all predecessor histories
remain unchanged.
Repeat this step for all histories of length t and of length t+ 1.
2. Assume that Πh(θt) < Π̃l(θt). Replace play after (θt, θh) by play after
(θt, θl). This leads to on-path profits of Π̂h(θt) = Π̃l(θt). Set bhnew(θ
t) =
blnew(θ

















. (By Step 1. and





.) (TTh), (TTl) and (IC) at history θt now hold
with equality. Previous constraints remain unchanged, with the excep-
tion of previous (IC)-constraints, which are relaxed. It remains to be
shown that the (DEl)-constraint at history θt continues to hold. As the
proof of Lemma 6 shows, the fact that (DEl) and (TTh) previously held










As Πh(θt) < Π̃l(θt), this implies −n(θt)c+ δΠl(θt) ≥ 0, which was to be
shown.
Furthermore, we can show (for later use) that, for histories θt such that
nh(θt) ≤ nl(θt), Πl(θt) ≥ Π̃h(θt). To the contrary, assume that Πl(θt) <
Π̃h(θt). Replace play after (θt, θl) by play after (θt, θh). This leads to on-
path profits of Π̂l(θt) = Π̃h(θt). Set bhnew(θ
t) = blnew(θ
t) = n(θt)c, while

















. (TTh), (TTl) and (IC) at history θt now
hold with equality. Previous constraints remain unchanged, with the
exception of previous (IC) and (IR) constraints, which are relaxed. It
remains to be shown that (DEl)-constraint at history θt continues to
hold. As the proof of Lemma 3 shows, the fact that (DEl) and (TTh)
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As Πl(θt) < Πh(θt)− (θh − θl)g(nh(θt)) = Π̃h(θt), this implies
−n(θt)c + δΠh(θt) ≥ δ(θh − θl)
(
qg(nl(θt) + (1− q)g(nh(θt))
)
.
As nh(θt) ≤ nl(θt), this implies −n(θt)c+ δΠh(θt) ≥ δ(θh− θl)g(nh(θt)),
or −n(θt)c+ δΠ̂l(θt) ≥ 0, which was to be shown.
After Operation 2., we have to repeat Operations 1. As Operations 1. leave
profits and effort levels unchanged, there is no need to repeat Operation 2.
after that. Furthermore, we can repeat these operations for all histories of
length t and after that for all histories of length t − 1, t − 2, · · · . Finally,
assume U(θ1) > 0. Reducing w(θ1) by U(θ1) increases Π(θ1) and only affects
the agent’s first-period (IR) constraint, which continues to hold.
To show that bh(θt) ≥ bl(θt) for all histories θt, assume to the contrary
that there exists a history θt such that bh(θt) < bl(θt). Because of part 2, this
implies that (TTh) is slack. Increase bh(θt) by a small ε > 0 and reduce bl(θt)
by q
1−q
ε. This leaves all (IC) constraints unaffected and relaxes the (DEl)
and (TTl) constraints at history θt. (TTh) is tightened, while nonetheless
remaining slack as long as bh(θt) < bl(θt). Finally, all constraints and profits
at predecessor histories remain unchanged.
We now show that the (TTl) constraint can be omitted and the (IC)
constraint will bind. If nh(θt) ≤ nl(θt), it immediately follows from the fact
that bh(θt) ≥ bl(θt) and Πl(θt) ≥ Π̃h(θt) that (TTl) can be omitted. So
suppose that nh(θt) > nl(θt), and suppose that the (TTl) constraint binds.
By Lemma 4, this implies that the (TTh) constraint is slack. We can therefore
increase bh(θt) by a small ε > 0 while decreasing w(θt) by qε. This leaves
all previous constraints and profits unaffected yet relaxes the current (IC)
and (TTl) constraints (while tightening the current (TTh) constraint and
leaving the current (DEl) constraint unaffected). Now suppose that the (IC)
constraint is slack. If bl(θt) > 0, we can decrease bh(θt) > 0 and bl(θt) > 0
by some ε > 0, while increasing w(θt) by ε. This leaves all previous profits
as well as all previous and current constraints unaffected, with the exception
of the current (DEl)-constraint, which is relaxed. If now bl(θt) = 0 and the
(IC) and (TTl) constraints are slack, we can decrease bh(θt) by some ε > 0,
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while increasing w(θt) by ε
q
. This leaves all previous constraints and profits
unaffected, yet relaxes the current (TTh) constraint (while tightening the
current (TTl) and (IC) constraints and leaving the current (DEl) constraint
unaffected). If bl(θt) = 0 and the (TTl) constraint binds, we can replace play
after (θt, θl) by play after (θt, θh) while setting bhnew(θ
t) = blnew(θ
t) = n(θt)c
and increasing w(θt) by (1 − q)(Πlnew(θ
t) − Πlold(θ
t)) + qbhold(θ
t) − n(θt)c. As
Πlnew(θ







t) ≥ n(θt)c by the
(IC) constraint, the increase in w(θt) is positive. Therefore, previous (IC)
and (IR) constraints are relaxed while all other previous constraints remain
unaffected by our change. Furthermore, the current (TTh), (TTl) and (IC)
constraints all hold with equality by construction. It remains to show that the
current (DEl) constraint continues to hold, i.e. that −n(θt)c + δΠlnew(θ
t) =
−n(θt)c + δΠ̃h(θt) ≥ 0. Yet, the binding (TTl) implies that δΠlold(θ
t) =
−bhold(θ
t) + δΠ̃h(θt) ≥ 0, which implies that the current (DEl) constraint will




≥ n(θt)c by the (IC) constraint.
Because U(θt) = w(θt) − n(θt)c + qbh(θt) + (1 − q)bl(θt) = 0, a binding
(IC) constraint implies that w(θt) = 0 for all histories θt. 
The following lemma shows that the (DEl) and (TTh) constraints can be
combined into one.
Lemma 6 Maximum profits in the problem in which (TTh) and (DEl) are
replaced by the following constraint (EC) equal maximum equilibrium profits:
−n(θt)c+ δ
(







Optimal bonus payments are given by bh(θt) = bl(θt) = n(θt)c if





> δΠl(θt) = bl(θt)
otherwise.
Proof. By Lemma 5, we can without loss focus on equilibria in which
n(θt)c = qbh(θt) + (1− q)bl(θt) (B.1)
at every history θt. Using (B.1) and multiplying (TTh) with q and adding it
to (DEl) yields (EC).
To prove that (EC) implies (TTh) and (DEl) given (B.1), assume that we
are at an optimum satisfying the properties of Lemma 5 and that (EC) holds.
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We shall now show that it is always possible to find non-negative bonus pay-
ments bh(θt) and bl(θt) such that (B.1) holds, and that (DEl) and (TTh) are





First suppose that n(θt)c ≤ δΠl(θt). In this case, we set bh(θt) = n(θt)c.
Now, (DEl) will trivially hold (with slackness if n(θt)c < δΠl(θt)). Using





is implied by the second part of Lemma 5. Now suppose that n(θt)c > δΠl(θt).





> 0. Clearly, (DEl)
will trivially hold with equality (because bl(θt) = δΠl(θt)). Substituting bh(θt)
into (TTh) yields 1
q
times (EC). 
While effort dynamics in the case of public types are completely sta-
tionary (see Lemma 1), this is no longer the case with private types, as the
following lemma shows. In order to state this lemma, we define, for every
history θt := (θh, θ2, θ3, · · · , θt), the function
i(θt) :=
{




ι ∈ N : θt−ι+n = θ
l ∀n ∈ {0, · · · , ι}
}
+ 1 if θt = θ
l
,
which indicates the number of consecutive low periods immediately preceding
period t along a given history θt.
Lemma 7 There exists an optimal equilibrium with the property that, for
every two histories θt and θ̃t̃, nh(θt) = nh(θ̃t̃). Furthermore, for every history
θt, nl(θt) = nli(θt).
Proof. Consider an optimum satisfying the properties of Lemmas 5 and
6. Suppose that there exists a history θt such that Πh(θt) < maxθ̂τΠ
h(θ̂τ ).









, where θ̃ ∈ argmaxθ̂τΠ
h(θ̂τ ). By virtue of our iid assumption,
this is feasible. This increases profits and relaxes some (EC) constraints with-
out tightening any previous ones. This establishes that Πh(θt) = Π
h
for all θt
(if two different continuation plays lead to argmaxθ̂τΠ
h(θ̂τ ), we select one to




). Therefore, there exists an optimum in
which for any history θt, nh(θt) = nh and nl(θt) = nli(θt). 
In the following, we shall write nh := n(θt) for all θt such that θt = θ
h;
we shall write nli = n
l
i(θt) = n(θ
t+1) for all θt+1 = (θt, θl). By the same token,
we shall write Πh and Πli for the corresponding optimal profits. These results
allow us to restate our problem as on page 16 in the main text.
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The following two lemmata summarize further aspects of an optimal equi-
librium: Effort levels are always weakly below first-best levels, and profits are
weakly increasing in the discount factor δ.




h ≤ nFBh .
Proof. Consider an optimum satisfying the properties of Lemmas 5, 6
and 7. Suppose there exists a history θt such that n(θt) > nFB(θt). Reduce
n(θt) by a small ε > 0. This increases profits and relaxes the (EC) constraints
at all predecessor histories. 
Lemma 9 For every history θt, maximal profits Π(θt) are weakly increasing
in δ. Furthermore, a higher δ relaxes (EC) constraints.






. We first show that a higher δ relaxes (EC)
constraints; i.e., for any discount factor δ̃ > δ̂, previously optimal actions nh(δ̂)
and nli(δ̂) continue to satisfy the (EC) constraints. We show this by induction
over the number of periods, starting from the first period, in which the dis-
count factor rises from δ̂ to δ̃. First, suppose only the discount factor between
the first and the second period rises. The (EC) constraint in the first period






+δ(1−q)Πl0 ≥ 0. In Lemma





all histories θt. Since Πl(θt) ≥ 0, the term in square brackets is non-negative.
Hence, (EC) in period 1 becomes slacker, and the actions that were optimal
at the discount factor δ̂ can still be enforced at the higher discount factor δ̃.
By Lemma 8, these actions lead to (weakly) higher profits. The argument for
the induction step is analogous. 
B.2 Proofs of Propositions 3–5
Proof of Proposition 3
The (EC) constraint to enforce first-best effort levels is given by
−nFB(θt)c+ δ
(








The left-hand side can be bounded from below by
− nFB(θt)c+ δqΠ



















Since θhg(nFBh )− n
FB
h c > 0 by assumption and because g(n
FB
l ) is finite, this
expression diverges to infinity as δ → 1. Since, by Lemma 9, (EC) constraints
are relaxed by larger values of δ, the claim follows. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Define δ ∈ (0, 1) as the smallest discount factor such that (ECh) holds as an




l , for all i ∈ N; i.e.,
δ is the smallest discount factor such that
−nFBh c+ δ
(







Note that given first-best effort levels, (ECh) is continuous in δ. Furthermore,
δ > 0 follows from no effort being enforceable for δ = 0. Because nFBh > n
FB
l ,
all (ECl) constraints are slack at δ for first-best effort levels.
Now, consider the relaxed problem of maximizing Πh subject only to
(ECh). The Lagrange function for this problem is given by












































By our assumptions on g, the objective function and the constraint are twice





. If θl ≥ qθh, the
Lagrangian is strictly concave in the choice variables, and the first-order con-
ditions are necessary and sufficient for an optimum. If θl < qθh, the first-order
conditions are necessary for a global optimum.12
























































Furthermore, optimality requires ∂L
∂nl
i
= 0, implying θlg′(nli) = c, for all
i ≥ 1.
Thus, once (ECh) binds and hence λECh > 0, θ
hg′(nh)−cmust be positive
for the respective first-order condition to hold; nh will thus be below its first-
best level. In addition, if nl0 > 0, θ
lg′(nl0)−cmust be positive for the first-order
condition to hold, so that nl0 will be below its first-best level as well. Effort
levels nli are at their efficient level n
FB
l for all i ≥ 1.
Let nh(δ) be defined by θhg′(nh(δ)) = c1−δ(1−q)
δq
. As g′ is continuous,
strictly decreasing and takes on all values in (0,∞), nh(δ) exists and is unique;
furthermore, the Inverse Function Theorem implies that it is a continuous












θl − qθh > 0
0 otherwise.
Again, as g′ is continuous, strictly decreasing and takes on all values in (0,∞),
nl(δ) exists and is unique; furthermore, the Inverse Function Theorem implies
by substituting the binding (ECh) constraint into the objective. Indeed, considering nl0 as
a function of nh, one shows that this objective function is strictly concave in nh, strictly




Lemma 8, decreasing at nh = nh
FB
. Of course, as the global optimum satisfies the first-order
conditions, the properties we derive from them apply to the optimum in this case as well.
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that it is a continuous function of δ. Clearly, the solution (n̂h, n̂l0)(δ) to the
problem in which only (ECh) is imposed entails (n̂h, n̂l0)(δ) ∈ I, where I :=
[nh(δ), nFBh ]× [n
l(δ), nFBl ].
13 Direct computation shows the partial derivatives
of (ECh) with respect to nh and nl0 respectively to be strictly negative a.e. on
I, while, because δ ≤ δ̄ < 1, its partial derivative with respect to δ is bounded.
Hence, it is feasible to have a policy (n̂h, n̂l0) that is continuous in δ, implying
that the optimal profits Π̂h in this problem are a continuous function of δ. As
(nh, nl0) impacts the (ECli) constraints only via the profits Π
h, and since these
constraints are continuous in Πh, all (ECli) constraints hold for the solutions
of this reduced problem in a neighborhood of δ.14 By the argument underlying
the proof of Lemma 9, the (ECh) constraint becomes tighter as the discount
factor δ decreases. Thus, Π̂h(δ) is (weakly) increasing. We can thus take δ as
low as the discount factor at which the (ECli) constraints, i ≥ 1, just hold as
an equality for nli = n
FB
l , and n
h = n̂h and nl0 = n̂
l
0, as characterized by the
Kuhn-Tucker system above.
It remains to show that nh > nFBl . Suppose to the contrary that n
h ≤
nFBl . Yet this solution is dominated by n̂




l , which leads to
higher profits and is feasible since all (ECli)-constraints (for i ≥ 1) hold for
nli = n
FB
l even for the initial n
h and nl0. 
Proof of Proposition 5
By definition of δ, some ECli (i ≥ 1) will bind in some left-neighborhood of
δ, while ECl0 remains slack. In this neighborhood, the profit-maximizing nli






























) by showing that the partial derivative of (ECh)
with respect to nl0 (n












(ECl0) is slacker than the other (ECli) constraints, and thus continues to hold as well.
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for all i ≥ 1. We proceed in several steps.
Lemma 10 For any i ≥ 1, Πl1 ≥ Π
l
i.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that Πlj > Π
l
1, for some j > 1. For all
i ≥ 1, replace ni by nj+i−1. (This operation is feasible because all (ECli) were
satisfied by assumption.) Thus, our previous Πl1 cannot solve our maximiza-
tion problem. 
Lemma 11 nl1 ≥ n
l
i∀i
Proof.Suppose to the contrary that there is a j > 1 with nlj > n
l
1. Re-
place nlj with n
l
1 and the continuation play following n
l
j with the continuation





by Lemma 10). 







Proof. We proceed by induction over i. That Πl3 ≤ Π
l
1 follows from
Lemma 10. For the induction step, suppose that Πlj ≥ Π
l
j+2, for some odd
integer j. We have to show that Πlj+2 ≥ Π
l
j+4. Suppose to the contrary that
Πlj+2 < Π
l




i+2. This is feasible
if nlj+1 ≤ n
l
j+3. Therefore, our operation increases Π
l










can replace nli by n
l
i+2 for all i ≥ j + 1. This replacement is feasible and









for all i ≥ j + 1. This is feasible if nlj ≥ n
l





can replace nli+2 by n
l
i for all i ≥ j. Because, by the induction hypothesis,
Πlj ≥ Π
l
j+2, this increases Π
l
1.
Suppose that nlj < n
l





for all i ≥ j. This is clearly feasible and (weakly) profitable (as Πlj ≥ Π
l
j+2).







Proof. Suppose to the contrary that Πlj+4 < Π
l
j+2 for some even integer
j. Then, we can replace all nli+2 by n
l
i for all i ≥ j + 2. This is feasible as
nlj+1 ≥ n
l




j+2 for some even integer
j. Replace all nli by n
l
i+2 for all i ≥ j. This is clearly feasible and (weakly)


















integer j < i. Consider the biggest such integer j, i.e., nlj+1 6= n
l
j+3. First,
assume that j is even, i.e., j + 1 is odd and, by Lemma 12, nlj+1 > n
l
j+3.
Replace all nlι+2 by n
l





(weakly) profitable (as Πlj+1 ≥ Π
l
j+3). Second, assume that j is odd, i.e., j+1
is even and, by Lemma 13, nlj+1 < n
l




ι+2 for all ι ≥ j+1.
This is feasible as nlj = n
l



















integer j > i. Consider the smallest such integer j, i.e., nlj−1 = n
l
j+1. First,
assume that j−1 is even, i.e., j is odd and, by Lemma 12, nlj > n
l
j+2. Replace
all nlι+2 by n
l





profitable (as Πlj ≥ Π
l
j+2). Second, assume that j − 1 is odd, i.e., j is even
and, by Lemma 13, nlj < n
l




ι+2 for all ι ≥ j. This is
feasible as nlj−1 = n
l


















1 for all even j. Hence,
by Lemma 15, nlι = n
l







1 and the continuation play following n
l
3 with the
continuation play following nl1. This is feasible and (weakly) profitable (as
Πlj ≤ Π
l
1 by Lemma 10). 
Lemma 17 Assume there is one i for which the (ECli) constraint is slack.
Then, the (ECli+1) constraint binds.
Proof. To the contrary, assume that the (ECli+1) constraint is slack.
Increase nli+1 by a small ε > 0. This is feasible and increases Π
l
1. 
Lemma 18 Assume there is one odd i > 1 for which the (ECli) constraint is
slack. Then, nlj = n
l
FB∀j ≥ 1.
Proof. Suppose (ECli) is slack for i odd, with i > 1. Then, there must








































1 for all even j.
By Lemma 12, we have Πl1 ≥ Π
l













1 for all j ≥ 1. Therefore, the Lagrange





Lemma 18 implies that, in our left-neighborhood of δ, all odd-numbered
constraints will bind, i.e. the Lagrange parameters satisfyλj > 0 for all odd
integers j.
Lemma 19 Assume there is one even i for which the (ECli) constraint is
slack. Then, the (EClj) constraints are slack for any even j. Moreover, nlj =
nlj+2 = ... = n
l




ι+2 = ... = n
l
2 for any even ι.
Proof. Suppose (ECli) is slack for i even. Then, there must exist an






















hence Πι = Π
l
2 for all even ι. It follows that (EClι) is slack for all even ι.
Thus, nlι = n
l
2 for all even ι.
By Lemma 12, we have Πl1 ≥ Π
l









for all odd j. Thus, nlj = n
l
1 for all odd j. Therefore, the Lagrange parameters
λι = λι+2 = 0 for all even ι. 
The previous lemmata imply that there are two possibilities for an op-
timum. Either, all even (ECli) constraints are slack, in which case nlj = n
l
1
for all odd j and nlι = n
l
2 for all even ι. Otherwise, all (ECli) constraints will
bind. In the following, we characterize effort levels nli (i ≥ 1) for the latter
possibility.
Lemma 20 Assume all (ECli) constraints bind. Then, either nl1 = n
l
3 =



















Proof. To the contrary, assume that nlj+2 > n
l
j for j even, but that
nlj+3 = n
l




j+4 = ... and n
l
j+3 =




j+4. But then, (EClj) can not
bind, a contradiction. The same logic can be applied to show that nlj+2 < n
l
j
for j odd, but that nlj+3 = n
l
j+1, is not feasible. 








Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exist integers i and j such
























































< 0. Therefore, Πlj+1 −




j and the continuation play af-
ter nli by the continuation play after n
l
j is feasible, and also strictly profitable.

Lemma 22 Suppose all (ECli) constraints bind. Then, supj∈N n
l
2j ≤ infj∈N n
l
2j−1.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that supj∈N n
l
2j > infj∈N n
l
2j−1. Then, by
Lemmata 12 and 13, this implies lim supj∈N n
l
2j > lim infj∈N n
l
2j−1. Therefore,




2i+1. By Lemma 21, this
implies that Πl2i > Π
l
2i+1. Yet, as all constraints (EClι), and in particular






2i+1 implies that n
l
2i−2 >




2i−1. As furthermore Π
l
2i ≥
Πl2i−2 by Lemma 13 and all constraints, in particular (ECli−2) and (ECli−3),
are binding, we can conclude that nl2i−2 > n
l
2i−3 and thus, by Lemma 21,
Πl2i−2 > Π
l





to Lemma 11. 


















, s.t. (ECli) con-

































































































































= 0 yields that nl1 < n
l






















g′(nl2)− cλ2 = 0.
Therefore qθh > θl implies nl1 > n
l
2. To show that qθ
h = θl ⇒ nl1 = n
l
2, we
first assume that λ2 = 0 and verify later that it holds.




2. Furthermore, if λ2 = 0, Lemma 19
implies that nl1 = n
l





















































































For qθh = θl and nl1 = n
l
2, the left hand side equals zero, hence (ECl2) is
satisfied. 
This concludes the proof of Proposition 5. 
C Proof of Proposition 6 in Section 5
First, we show that nhh = nhl ≡ nh and nlh = nll ≡ nl. To do so, we
omit (TT) constraints and solve the problem only subject to (TT2) and (DE)
constraints. Then, we show that the solution to this relaxed problem also
satisfies (TT) constraints.



























Note that effort is never above the respective first-best effort level. Now,
assume to the contrary that nhh > nhl. If (DEhl) binds, plugging−nhlc+δΠ
l
=
0 into (TThl2) yields θhg(nhl) ≥ θhg(nhh) which is violated for nhh > nhl. If




, relaxes (TThl2), and does not violate (TThh2), (DEhl) or any other
constraint. Continue until either nhh = nhl or (DEhl) binds. In the latter case,
recall that (TThl2) is violated for a binding (DEhl) constraint and nhh > nhl.
Next, assume nhh < nhl. If (DEhh) binds, plugging −nhhc + δΠ
h
= 0
into (TThh2) yields θhg(nhh) ≥ θhg(nhl) which is violated for nhh < nhl. If
(DEhh) does not bind, increase nhh by a small ε > 0. This operation increases
Π
h
, relaxes (TThh2), and does not violate (TThl2) and (DEhh) or any other
constraint. Continue until either nhh = nhl or (DEhh) binds. In the latter
case, recall that (TThh2) is violated for a binding (DEhh) constraint and
nhh > nhl.
Thus, we have shown that nhh = nhl ≡ nh in this reduced problem.
Accordingly, it can be shown that nlh = nll ≡ nl. Taking this into account,































+ δ(1 − q)Π
l













Therefore, effort levels to this constrained maximization problem are
given by discount factors, δ and δ, with 0 < δ < δ < 1, with
• nh = nFBh and n
l = nFBl for δ ≥ δ
• nl = nFBl < n
h < nFBh for δ < δ < δ
• nl = nh ≤ nFBl for δ ≤ δ
To complete the proof, we have to show that these effort levels do not violate

































































qg(nhh) + (1− q)g(nhl)
]
≥ 0. (TTll)
Plugging nhh = nhl = nh and nlh = nll = nl into the (TT) constraints, re-













yields an equivalence of (TThh) and (TTlh), as well as of (TThl) and (TTll).



















For δ > δ, these conditions hold strictly (the latter because nFBl max-
imizes θlg(nl) − nlc), for δ ≤ δ and hence nl = nh they hold as equalities.

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D Proofs for Section 6
D.1 Permanent Shocks
First, note that an equivalent result to Lemma 4 is immediate: (TTh) and







thermore, we can show that there exists an optimal equilibrium with the
property n(θt) ≤ nFB(θt), i.e., a result equivalent to Lemma 8 obtains.
Indeed, suppose to the contrary that n(θt) > nFB(θt) for some history
θt. Then, reduce n(θt) by some ε > 0, while increasing w(θt) in such a way
as to leave the principal’s profits unchanged. This relaxes the (IR) and (IC)
constraints at history θt and at all predecessor histories, while all (DE) and
(TT) constraints remain unchanged. Thus, reducing n(θt) cannot do any
harm.
We now prove
Lemma 24 The effort levels satisfy nh ≥ supi∈N n
l
i.






nh < supi∈N n
l
i =: n̄





given by n̂h = n̂li = n̄
l, ŵh = ŵli = 0, and b̂
h = b̂li = n̄c, for all i ∈ N
leads to higher profits Π̂h > Πh and Π̂l ≥ Πli (i ∈ N), where Π̂
h (Πh) and Π̂l
(Πli) are the profits associated with policy σ̂ (σ), respectively. As policy σ
satisfies all (DEli)-constraints, we have that −nlic + δΠ̂
l ≥ −nlic + δΠ
l
i ≥ 0.
This implies −n̄lc+ δΠ̂l ≥ 0, i.e., the policy σ̂ satisfies all (DEli)-constraints.
Moreover, (TTh) and (TTl) hold with equality. This is a contradiction to
policy σ being optimal. 
Now, we are ready to prove
Lemma 25 There exists an optimal equilibrium with the properties that, for
every history θt,
• the (TTl) constraint can be omitted,
• n(θt)c = qbh(θt) + (1− q)bl(θt) and w(θt) = 0.
Proof. Lemma 24 implies that, if both (TTh) and (TTl) bind, nh = nlτ = n̄
for all τ ∈ N. In this case, bh = bl0 ≥ n̄c.














(TTh) is slack. We can therefore increase bh by a small ε > 0 while decreasing
wh by qε. This leaves all constraints and profits unaffected yet relaxes the
(IC) and (TTl) constraints (while tightening the (TTh) constraint and leaving
the (DEli) constraints unaffected). Now suppose that the (IC) constraint is
slack. If bl0 > 0, we can decrease b
h > 0 and bl0 > 0 by some ε > 0, while
increasing wh by ε. This leaves profits as well as all constraints unaffected,
with the exception of the (DEl0)-constraint, which is relaxed. If now bl0 = 0
and the (IC) and (TTl) constraints are slack, we can decrease bh by some
ε > 0, while increasing wh by ε
q
. This leaves all constraints and profits unaf-
fected, yet relaxes the (TTh) constraint (while tightening the (TTl) and (IC)
constraints and leaving the (DEl0) constraint unaffected). If bl0 = 0 and the
(TTl) constraint binds, we can replace nlτ by n




hc. The (TTh), (TTl) and (IC) constraints all hold with
equality by construction. It remains to show that the (DEli) constraints con-
tinue to hold, i.e. that −n̄c + δΠli,new = −n̄c + δΠ̃
h ≥ 0. Yet, the binding
(TTl) implies that δΠl0,old = −b
h
old(θ
t) + δΠ̃h(θt) ≥ 0, which implies that the
(DEli) constraints will hold after our change, as bhold ≥
nhc
q
≥ nhc by the (IC)
constraint.
Because Uh = wh − nhc + qbh + (1− q)bl0 = 0, a binding (IC) constraint






τ+1 = 0, a binding
(IC) constraint implies that wlτ = 0 for all τ ∈ N. 
We are now ready to show the equivalent of Lemma 9.
Lemma 26 Maximal profits Πh and Πli (i ∈ N) are weakly increasing in δ.
Furthermore, a higher δ relaxes the (ECh) and (DEli)-constraints.
Proof. Suppose the discount factor rises from δ̂ to δ̃ > δ̂. The actions
that were optimal at δ̂ continue to satisfy all (DEli) for δ̃. By Lemma 8, these
actions lead to weakly higher profits. It thus only remains to show that (ECh)
is relaxed as δ increases. For this, we compute the derivative D of (ECh) with




































































Inserting this gives us




























































(1 + (1− δq)i)δi(θlg(nli)− n
l
ic) ≥ 0.
By Lemma 24, we know that nh ≥ n̄l; by Lemma 8, this implies that
62


















which was to be shown. 
Proof of Proposition 7
We first omit (DEl) constraints and show ex post that they hold at the solu-
tions of the relaxed problem. Denoting by λ the Lagrange parameter associ-
ated with the (ECh) constraint, the Lagrange function equals
L =

























































δ < δh implies λ > 0. Hence, condition (D.2) gives nh < nFBh , whereas
(D.3) gives nli < n
FB





q < 1, lim
i→∞
qi+1 = 0, hence θlg′(nli)− c = 0.
To show that nli < n
l
i+1, rewrite conditions (D.3) for n
l




















































































− qi+2 (θh − θl) g′(nli+1)
] = 0




> 0 because nli+1 < n
FB
l . The term in squared brackets
must be strictly negative: It captures the partial derivative of the left hand side
of the (ECh) constraint with respect to nli+1. If it were positive, a larger value
of nli+1 (which is feasible) would relax the (ECh) constraint, contradicting





















. This is equivalent to
g′(nli) > g




i due to the strict concavity of g(·).
Finally, note that the derived nli satisfy all (DEli) constraints, −n
l
ic +






















≥ 0, that is −nlic+δθ
lg(nli) ≥ 0, holds. Because δ ≥ δ
l,
this condition would hold for nli = n
FB
l . Because g(·) is strictly increasing and
concave, and because g(0) = 0, −nFBl c+ δθ
lg(nFBl ) ≥ 0 implies that this also
holds for all nli < n
FB
l . 



























(1− δ) (1− δ (qh − ql))
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Denoting by λ the Lagrange parameter associated with the (ECh) con-














































































































The existence of a δh, with λ = 0 for δ ≥ δh, follows from the enforce-
ability of first-best effort levels for δ → 1.
Now, consider a left neighborhood of δh where nhFB and n
l
FB do not
satisfy (ECh), and thus λ > 0. Condition (D.4) gives nh < nFBh , whereas
65
(D.5) gives nli < n
FB



















To show that nli < n
l
i+1, rewrite conditions (D.5) for n
l































































































. This is equivalent to
g′(nli) > g




i due to the strict concavity of g(·).
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